rights (McAdam, 1996: 29) . Constituent assemblies, in particular, present ample spaces for collective action, within the assembly itself and through concurrent movement activity in the streets. As constitution-makers seek to reconstitute the bonds between state and society, the parameters of all political institutions are contested, providing a broad scope for citizenship demands. The dimensions, powers, and identity of the state itself--the typical focus of social movement contestation in Latin America (Foweraker, 1995: 31-35 )--are up for grabs.
Indigenous peoples' social movement organizations were among the civil society actors who gained the most from the political opportunity presented by the convergence of severe governability crises with the prospect of sweeping political reforms. I compare the Venezuelan reform experience--the latest in the series--with experiences in neighboring countries. As social movement scholars recently urged, I provide a comparative assessment of the political impact of social movements (Foweraker and Landman, 1997: 44; McAdam, McCarthy and Zald, 1996: 20) . I identify factors that enabled marginalized, weakly institutionalized political actors to become active participants in and beneficiaries of the process of "constitutional transformation" underway in the Andes. As defined by Pogany (1996: 568) constitutional transformation connotes the adoption of new values by a state's political and legal institutions. In Venezuela, Indians successfully infused new values (diversity, inclusion, collective citizenship) into political institutions, secured a permanent space in the state, and, thus, transformed relations between state and society and between Indians and non-Indians.
Venezuela represents a "least likely" case a marginalized group obtaining constitutional rights. In this article I examine how Venezuelan Indians obtained rights that are comparable or superior to those obtained in neighboring countries with more consolidated movements. I argue that three changes in the political opportunity structure (POS)--the totality of constraints on and incentives for collective action that state institutions and the political system present--enabled Venezuela's indigenous movement to secure these achievements. POS scholars typically feature two of these factors--the support of key allies, and a dramatic shift in elite alignments and internal cleavages--among a small set of salient POS variables (Foweraker, 1995: 71-72; Tarrow, 1998: 25, 80) . 4 The third factor--the role of "international trends and events in shaping domestic institutions and alignments" (McAdam, 1996: 34)--has received less attention from social movement scholars. In Venezuela, the Latin American trend to codify indigenous rights in constitutions enabled indigenous constituent assembly delegates to argue credibly that Venezuela--a society with a marked affection for all things modern--had the hemisphere's least-modern regime of indigenous rights. The impact of the international trend to codify indigenous rights also represents what Tarrow (1998: 186 ) calls a "cross-border diffusion" effect, in which social movement ideas and forms of organization cross national borders and challenge similar targets. A final factor that explains the success of Venezuela's indigenous movement is derived from sustained interaction between the social movement and the changing political opportunity structure. I show how the Venezuelan indigenous movement's struggle for guaranteed representation in the constitutional reform process during the year preceding the constituent assembly, together with institutional support from the Venezuelan state and sympathetic civil society actors, helped the movement to consolidate itself as a coherent protagonist during the reform process.
THE INDIGENOUS MOVEMENT AND INDIGENOUS RIGHTS IN VENEZUELA
According to the 1992 census, Venezuela's indigenous population numbers 315,815
persons--approximately 1.5 percent of the total population--belonging to 38 distinct groups. Indians mainly are settled in 10 states, principally in frontier zones (CONIVE, 1999: 82 Venezuelan organizations also have demonstrated relatively greater timidity with respect to alliances with non-indigenous actors. This is attributable to fears of cooptation or exploitation as well as a belief that non-Indians are incapable of understanding indigenous aspirations and cultures. Although they often form short-term alliances to achieve immediate goals--such as the successful mobilization in Amazonas around the state constitution--indigenous organizations seldom invest in long-term strategic alliances (Sendas, 1998: 27, 29 (Crisp and Levine, 1998: 31; Crisp, Levine, and Rey, 1994: 141, 150; McCoy, 2000) .
Sectors within the political elite had begun to agitate for constitutional reform in the early 1980s, unleashing an "orgy" of proposed political and socio-economic reforms.
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Little progress was made, however, because political parties and business and labor organizations embedded in the state were unwilling to sacrifice their own interests.
Electoral and other decentralizing reforms that were enacted resulted from the intensive mobilization of urban neighborhood movements since the 1970s, rather than the leadership of political elites (Crisp and Levine, 1998: 41-45) . The reform impasse dissolved on parties' efforts to dominate the indigenous movement and impose their own delegates--strengthened CONIVE considerably and, thus, enabled it to achieve the constitutional recognition of indigenous rights. The Indians joined an assembly dominated by Chávez. Under the electoral formula used, the president's supporters converted 62.5 percent of the votes into 121 of 128 seats. 14 The two parties that had dominated Venezuelan politics for nearly half a century earned only one seat between them. Thus, most disputes within the Assembly arose within Chávez's coalition, leaving outsiders little influence (Kelly, 2000: 16) . The bipartisan elite monopoly on political power had been shattered, allowing new interests to share representation in the political system at a moment of radical state self-reform.
On August 6, the first day of discussions, indigenous delegate Noelí Pocaterra and had publicized its platform and placed its issues on the agenda of the official ANC, which opened on December 20 (see Andolina, 1998: 17-27, and Nielsen and Zetterberg, 1999: 39-41) .
In late September, the Indigenous Peoples' Rights Commission presented its , 1993: 6; 1999a: 57; 1999b: 20) .
Indigenous organizations also organized several fora that included indigenous participants in the Ecuadorian and Colombian reforms and experts from Ecuador, Guatemala, Mexico, and Nicaragua, enabling them to learn from experiences in other countries and to fortify their arguments with regional comparisons. 16 The fora were similar to those held in Quito in 1998 to share the experiences of participants in the Bolivian and Colombian reforms. 1999, p. 18; Economía Hoy, 3 nov. 1999, p. 8) .
Open conflict erupted on October 31, the day the indigenous rights proposal was first discussed in plenary session. With Indians dressed in paint and traditional costumes filling the upper gallery of the Senate, the two camps exchanged angry words. The ANC vice president shifted the debate to an ad hoc commission composed of the members of the commissions on Security and Defense and Indigenous Rights. During four days of intensive negotiations the ad hoc commission hammered out a compromise approving the term "indigenous peoples," with qualifications explicitly denying the association between the word "peoples" and the right to self-determination, as that term is used in international law. In addition, the terms "habitat" and "lands" replaced the term "territory." Most of the proposal passed on November 3 with 128 votes in favor and three abstentions. That day, Indians in the courtyard pounded on drums until the moment the approval was secured, after which Indians inside and outside sang the Venezuelan national hymn (El Nacional, 4 nov. 1999, p. 1; El Universal, 4 nov. 1999, p. 1; Sendas, 1999c: 5-6 ).
Bolivian, Colombian, and Ecuadorian Indians fought similar terminological battles.
Colombian indigenous ANC delegates refused to sign the charter unless the assembly recognized their territorial demands, and those of afro-Colombians. This ultimatum generated a crisis, since their refusal would have weakened the legitimacy of the charter.
The controversial articles were approved after the relevant language was made sufficiently vague and ambiguous to please all sides (Van Cott, 2000b: 77) . In Ecuador, indigenous delegates had to soften a longstanding demand that the constitution recognize the "plurinational" nature of the Ecuadorian state. Rather than identifying Indians as "nationalities," as CONAIE had wanted, the constitution recognizes that Indians "define themselves as nationalities" (Hoy, 25 April 1998; El Comercio, 25 April 1998) . In Bolivia, despite a fierce lobbying effort in the Congress, the lowland organization CIDOB and its allies in the state Subsecretariat of Ethnic Affairs failed to insert the word "territory" in the 1994 revised constitution, which refers instead to "original community lands." "Territory"
was inserted in the 1996 agrarian reform law, after CIDOB undertook a protracted march and demonstration (see, Van Cott, 2000b: 162, 198-199) . These terminological compromises have the hallmarks of an "apocryphal compromise": a procedural decision to postpone a substantive decision on an issue on which consensus does not exist while "finding an ambiguous formula which satisfies all the contradictory demands" (Kornblith, 1991: 80, citing from Carl Schmitt, Teoría de la Constitución). Indigenous delegates conceded on terminology in exchange for substantive and symbolic rights with which they could continue their struggle.
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The Venezuelan constitution was finished on November 19, 1999. On December 15, 71 percent of voters approved the new charter, with 40 percent of registered voters abstaining, due in part to torrential rains. Polls indicate that less than 2 percent of voters had read the constitution (Weekly News Update on the Americas, 1999).
CONCLUSION: CONSTITUTIONAL TRANSFORMATION?
The collapse of the political elite's longstanding monopoly on representation; the emergence of key allies within the Chávez government, civil society, and the interAmerican indigenous rights movement; the influence of a decisive regional trend toward constitutionally codifying indigenous rights; and the capacity of the indigenous organization CONIVE to take advantage of these important changes in political opportunity structure to consolidate itself as a movement organization, enabled
Venezuelan Indians to obtain a constitution containing the region's most progressive indigenous rights regime. Venezuelan constitution-makers incorporated most of the symbolic and programmatic rights that neighboring constitutions recognize (see table) , while making several interesting innovations--such as guaranteeing political representation at all levels of government (Art. 125) and prohibiting the registration of patents related to indigenous genetic resources or intellectual property associated with indigenous knowledge (Art. 124) (Kuppe, 1999 (Kuppe, /2000 . Symbolic achievements--rhetorical recognition of Venezuela as a "multiethnic and pluricultural state," and recognition of their special status by dint of including a separate chapter on "Rights of the Indigenous
Peoples"--may be enjoyed immediately. As in the other Andean cases, however, most programmatic rights require future legislation. (Table 1 about here.)
Aware of delays in other countries in securing implementation of constitutional rights that require legislative action, Venezuelan Indians achieved the insertion of transitory dispositions that facilitate the early implementation of some indigenous rights.
For example, in order to avoid delays in titling indigenous land that occurred in Bolivia and Colombia, Transitory Disposition 12 requires demarcation of indigenous habitats to be completed within two years of the charter's entry into force (Kuppe, 1999 (Kuppe, /2000 . (1998) and Miño and Macas (1997) . 12..CONIVE had asked for seven seats. 13..The Paraguayan government allocated four non-voting seats to Indians in Paraguay's 1991 constituent assembly, in addition to a seat earned by indigenous organizations in the elections. Sánchez (1996: 174-205 
